Vulnerability of deep neural networks for detecting COVID-19 cases from
  chest X-ray images to universal adversarial attacks by Hirano, Hokuto et al.
  
Vulnerability of deep neural networks for detecting 
COVID-19 cases from chest X-ray images to universal 
adversarial attacks 
 
Hokuto Hirano1, Kazuki Koga1, Kazuhiro Takemoto1* 
1) Department of Bioscience and Bioinformatics, Kyushu Institute of Technology, Iizuka, 
Fukuoka 820-8502, Japan 
*Corresponding author’s e-mail: takemoto@bio.kyutech.ac.jp 
 
Abstract 
Under the epidemic of the novel coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), chest X-ray 
computed tomography imaging is being used for effectively screening COVID-19 patients. 
The development of computer-aided systems based on deep neural networks (DNNs) has 
been advanced, to rapidly and accurately detect COVID-19 cases, because the need for 
expert radiologists, who are limited in number, forms a bottleneck for the screening. 
However, so far, the vulnerability of DNN-based systems has been poorly evaluated, 
although DNNs are vulnerable to a single perturbation, called universal adversarial 
perturbation (UAP), which can induce DNN failure in most classification tasks. Thus, we 
focus on representative DNN models for detecting COVID-19 cases from chest X-ray 
images and evaluate their vulnerability to UAPs generated using simple iterative 
algorithms. We consider nontargeted UAPs, which cause a task failure resulting in an input 
being assigned an incorrect label, and targeted UAPs, which cause the DNN to classify an 
input into a specific class. The results demonstrate that the models are vulnerable to 
nontargeted and targeted UAPs, even in case of small UAPs. In particular, 2% norm of the 
UPAs to the average norm of an image in the image dataset achieves >85% and >90% 
success rates for the nontargeted and targeted attacks, respectively. Due to the nontargeted 
UAPs, the DNN models judge most chest X-ray images as COVID-19 cases. The targeted 
UAPs make the DNN models classify most chest X-ray images into a given target class. 
The results indicate that careful consideration is required in practical applications of DNNs 
to COVID-19 diagnosis; in particular, they emphasize the need for strategies to address 
security concerns. As an example, we show that iterative fine-tuning of the DNN models 
using UAPs improves the robustness of the DNN models against UAPs.  
  
  
1. Introduction 
Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) [1] is an infectious disease caused by the 
coronavirus, called severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2. The epidemic of 
COVID-19 started from Wuhan, China [2], and has had a serious impact on public health 
and economy globally [3]. To reduce the spread of this epidemic, effective screening of 
COVID-19 patients is required. For this purpose, positive real-time polymerase chain 
reaction (PCR) tests are mainly used [4]; however, they are often time-consuming, 
laborious, and involve complicated manual processes. Chest radiography imaging, 
especially chest X-ray computed tomography (CT) imaging, is an alternative screening 
method [5], because patients present abnormalities in chest radiography images, which are 
characteristic of those infected with COVID-19 [2,6]. Moreover, there are advantages to 
leveraging chest X-ray imaging for COVID-19 screening amid the pandemic in terms of 
rapid triaging, portability, availability, and accessibility [7]. However, the visual 
differences in chest X-ray images among COVID-19-associated pneumonia, non-COVID-
19 pneumonia, and no pneumonia are subtle; thus, the need for expert radiologists, who 
are limited in number, forms a bottleneck for diagnoses based on radiography images. To 
avoid this limitation, computer-aided systems that can aid radiologists to more rapidly and 
accurately interpret radiography images to detect COVID-19 cases are highly desired [7,8]; 
in particular, deep neural networks (DNNs) are often used for this purpose. 
DNNs are widely used for image classification, a task in which an input image is assigned 
a class from a fixed set of classes, as well as medical science [9,10], including diagnoses 
based on radiography images. Specifically, DNN-based systems can detect subtle visual 
differences in the images; in particular, a DNN can accurately distinguish bacterial and 
viral pneumonia in chest X-ray images [11]. Inspired by these previous studies, many 
researchers have constructed large-scale datasets of chest radiography images on COVID-
19 [7,8,12,13] and have proposed DNN-based systems for screening COVID-19 cases from 
these images [8,14–17]. However, DNN-based systems in medical science have generally 
been closed-source and unavailable to the research community for deeper understanding 
and extension. Thus, Wang et al. [7] proposed COVID-Net, a deep convolutional neural 
network design tailored to detect COVID-19 cases from chest X-ray images, which is open-
source and available to the general public. As the authors mentioned [7], this study will be 
leveraged and build upon by both researchers and citizen data scientists to accelerate the 
development of highly accurate yet practical deep learning solutions for detecting COVID-
19 cases and accelerate COVID-19 treatment. The COVID-Net models are intended to be 
used as reference models; in fact, several DNN-based systems [18–20] for detecting 
COVID-19 cases have already been proposed, inspired by the COVID-Net study. 
However, previous studies have poorly evaluated the vulnerabilities in DNNs, although 
DNNs are known to be vulnerable to adversarial examples [21,22], which are input images 
that cause misclassifications by DNNs and usually generated by adding specific, 
imperceptible perturbations to original input images that have been correctly classified 
using DNNs. Notably, a single perturbation (called universal adversarial perturbation; 
UAP) [23] that can induce DNN failure in most image classification tasks is also known to 
exist. Moreover, DNNs are less robust to not only nontargeted attacks [23], which cause 
misclassification (i.e., a task failure resulting in an input image being assigned an incorrect 
  
class), but also targeted attacks [24], which cause the DNN to classify an input image into 
a specific class. The existence of adversarial examples questions the generalization ability 
of DNNs, reduces model interpretability, and limits the applications of deep learning in 
safety- and security-critical environments [25]. Specifically, vulnerability is a serious 
problem in medical diagnosis [26]. Thus, it is important to evaluate how vulnerable the 
proposed DNN-based systems are to adversarial attacks (attacks based on UAPs, in 
particular) in practical applications. In addition, defense strategies against adversarial 
attacks (i.e., adversarial defense [22]) are required. 
In this study, we focus on the COVID-Net models, which are representative models for 
detecting COVID-19 cases from chest X-ray images, and aim to evaluate the vulnerability 
of DNNs to adversarial attacks; specifically, the vulnerability to nontargeted and targeted 
attacks, based on UAPs, is investigated. Moreover, adversarial defense is considered; in 
particular, we evaluate how much the robustness of COVID-Net models to nontargeted and 
targeted UAPs increases using adversarial retraining [23,27] (i.e., fine-tuning with 
adversarial images).  
2. Material and methods 
2.1. COVID-Net models 
We forked the COVID-Net repository (github.com/lindawangg/COVID-Net) on May 1, 
2020, and obtained two DNN models for detecting COVID-19 cases from chest X-ray 
images: COVIDNet-CXR Small and COVIDNet-CXR Large. Moreover, we downloaded 
the COVIDx dataset, a collection of chest radiography images from several open-source 
chest radiography datasets, on May 1, 2020, according to the description in the COVID-
Net repository. The chest X-ray images in the dataset were classified into three classes: 
normal (no pneumonia), pneumonia (non-COVID19 pneumonia; e.g., viral and bacterial 
pneumonia), and COVID-19 (COVID-19 viral pneumonia). The dataset comprised 13,569 
training images (7,966 normal images, 5,451 pneumonia images, and 152 COVID-19 
images) and 231 test images (100 normal images, 100 pneumonia images, and 31 COVID-
19 images). 
2.2. Universal adversarial perturbations 
The UAPs for nontargeted and targeted attacks were generated using a simple iterative 
algorithm [23,24]. The algorithm considers a classifier, 𝐶(𝒙), which returns the class or 
label with the highest confidence score for an input image, 𝒙. The algorithm starts with 𝝆 = 𝟎 (no perturbation) and iteratively updates the UAP, 𝝆, under the constraint that the 𝐿! norm of the perturbation is equal to or less than a small 𝜉 value (i.e., 	‖𝝆‖! ≤ 𝜉), by 
additively obtaining an adversarial perturbation for an input image, 𝒙, which is randomly 
selected from an input image set, 𝑿, without replacement. These iterative updates continue 
till the number of iterations reaches the maximum 𝑖"#$. 
The fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [21] was used to obtain an adversarial perturbation 
for the input image, whereas the original UAP algorithm [23] uses the DeepFool method 
[28]. This is because FGSM is used for both nontargeted and targeted attacks, and 
DeepFool requires a higher computational cost than FGSM and only generates a 
  
nontargeted adversarial example for the input image. FGSM generates the adversarial 
perturbation, 𝝆/, for 𝒙 using gradient	∇𝒙𝐿(𝒙, 𝑦) of the loss function at the given image 𝒙 
and class 𝑦 with respect to the pixels [21]. For the 𝐿& norm, a nontargeted perturbation 
that causes misclassification is computed as 𝝆/ = ϵ ∙ sign(∇𝒙𝐿(𝒙, 𝐶(𝒙)) ), whereas a 
targeted perturbation that causes 𝐶 to classify image 𝒙 into class 𝑦 is obtained as 𝝆/ =−ϵ ∙ sign(∇𝒙𝐿(𝒙, 𝑦)), where ϵ (> 0) is the attack strength. For the 𝐿' and 𝐿( norms, a 
nontargeted perturbation is computed as 𝝆/ = ϵ ∙ ∇𝒙𝐿(𝒙, 𝐶(𝒙))/‖∇𝒙𝐿(𝒙, 𝐶(𝒙))‖!, whereas 
a targeted perturbation is obtained as 𝝆/ = −ϵ ∙ ∇𝒙𝐿(𝒙, 𝑦)/‖∇𝒙𝐿(𝒙, 𝑦)‖!. 
In the algorithms, FGSM is performed based on output 𝐶(𝒙 + 𝝆) of the classifier for the 
perturbated image, 𝒙 + 𝝆, at each iteration step. For nontargeted (targeted) attacks, an 
adversarial perturbation, 𝝆/ , for 𝒙 + 𝝆  is obtained using FGMS if 𝐶(𝒙 + 𝝆) = 𝐶(𝒙) 
(𝐶(𝒙 + 𝝆) ≠ 𝑦). After generating the adversarial example (i.e., 𝒙#)* ← 𝒙 + 𝝆 + 𝝆/) at this 
step, perturbation 𝝆	 is updated if 𝐶(𝒙#)*) ≠ 𝐶(𝒙)  ( 𝐶(𝒙#)*) = 𝑦 ) for nontargeted 
(targeted) attacks. When updating 𝝆, a projection function project, (𝒙, 𝑝, 𝜉), is used to 
satisfy the constraint that ‖𝝆‖! ≤ 𝜉 : 𝝆 ← project(𝒙#)* − 𝒙, 𝑝, 𝜉) , where poject(𝒙, 𝑝, 𝜉) = arg	min𝒙+‖𝒙 − 𝒙′‖( subject to ‖𝝆‖! ≤ 𝜉. 
The details of the algorithms are described in [23,24]. We used the nontargeted UAP 
algorithm available in the Adversarial Robustness 360 Toolbox (ART) [29] (version 1.0; 
github.com/IBM/adversarial-robustness-toolbox). The targeted UAP algorithm was 
implemented by modifying the nontargeted UAP algorithm in ART in our previous study 
[24] (github.com/hkthirano/targeted_UAP_CIFAR10). 
The nontargeted and targeted UAPs were generated using 13,569 training images in the 
COVIDx dataset. Parameter ϵ was set to 0.001; the cases where 𝑝 = 2 and ∞ were 
considered. Parameter 𝜉 was determined based on ratio 𝜁 of the 𝐿! norm of the UAP to 
the average 𝐿! norm of an image in the COVIDx dataset. The cases in which 𝜁 = 1% 
and 2% (i.e., almost imperceptible perpetuations) were considered. The average 𝐿& and 𝐿( norms were 237 and 32,589, respectively; 𝑖"#$ was set to 15. 
For comparing the performance of the generated UAPs with that of random controls, we 
also generated random vectors (random UAPs) sampled uniformly from the sphere of a 
given radius [23]. 
2.3. Vulnerability evaluation 
To evaluate the vulnerability of the DNN models to UAPs, we used the fooling rate, 𝑅,, 
and targeted the attack success rate, 𝑅-, of nontargeted and targeted attacks, respectively. 𝑅, for an image set is defined as the proportion of images that were not classified into their 
associated actual labels to all images in the set. 𝑅- for an image set is the proportion of 
adversarial images classified into the target class to all images in the set. Additionally, we 
obtained the confusion matrices to evaluate the change in prediction due to UAPs for each 
class (infection type). 
  
2.4. Adversarial retraining 
We performed adversarial retraining to increase the robustness of the COVID-Net models 
to UAPs [23,27]; in particular, the models were fine-tuned with adversarial images. The 
procedure was described in a previous study [23]. A brief description is as follows. 1) Ten 
UAPs against a DNN model were generated using the algorithm (for generating a 
nontargeted or targeted UAP) (Sec. 2.2) with the (clean) training image set. 2) A modified 
training image set was obtained by randomly selecting half of the training images and 
combining them with the rest in which each image was perturbed by a UAP randomly 
selected from 10 UAPs. 3) The model was fine-tuned by performing 5 extra epochs of 
training on the modified training image set. 4) A new UAP (against the fine-tuned model) 
was generated using the algorithm with the training image set. 5) Then, 𝑅, and 𝑅- of the 
UAP for the test images were computed. Steps 1)–5) were repeated five times. 
3. Results 
3.1. Performance of COVID-Net models 
The test accuracies of the COVIDNet-CXR Small and COVIDNet-CXR Large models 
were 92.6% and 94.4%, respectively, and their training accuracies were 95.8% and 94.1%, 
respectively. As shown in the COVID-Net study [7], we also confirmed that the COVID-
Net models achieved good accuracies. 
3.2. Vulnerability to nontargeted universal adversarial perturbations 
However, we found that both COVIDNet-CXR Small and COVIDNet-CXR Large models 
were vulnerable to nontargeted UAPs (Table 1). Specifically, the fooling rate, 𝑅,, of the 
UAPs with 𝜁 = 1% for the test image set was 81.0% at most. A higher 𝜁 led to a higher 𝑅,. We observed that 𝑅, of the UAP with 𝜁 = 2% for the test image set was between 
85.7% and 87.4%. Furthermore, the random UAPs with 𝜁 = 2%  misclassified the 
models; specifically, their 𝑅,  was 22.1% at most. The change in 𝑅,  did not exhibit 
significant dependence on the norm types (𝑝 = 2 or ∞). The difference in 𝑅, for the test 
image set between 𝑝 = 2 and 𝑝 = ∞ was approximately 7% at most, when the model 
and the other parameters were the same. 𝑅,  of the UAP against the COVIDNet-CXR 
Small model was lower than that of the COVIDNet-CXR Large model in the case of 𝜁 =1%, when the model and the other parameters were the same; however, no remarkable 
difference in 𝑅, between these models was observed in the case of 𝜁 = 2%. 𝑅, for the 
training image set was higher than that for the test image set because the UAPs were 
generated based on the training image set. 
  
  
Table 1. Fooling rates 𝑹𝒇 (%) of nontargeted UAPs against the COVID-Net models. 𝑅, for training and test images are presented. The values in the brackets indicate 𝑅, of 
random UAPs (random controls). 
𝒑 𝜻 COVIDNet-CXR Small COVIDNet-CXR Large 
Training Test Training Test 2 1% 61.4 (1.3) 58.0 (0.4) 90.0 (2.5) 81.0 (3.9) 
2% 98.5 (12.6) 87.4 (16.0) 97.4 (17.9) 85.7 (22.1) ∞	 1% 70.8 (1.0) 64.9 (1.3) 84.8 (2.0) 77.1 (3.5) 
2% 98.5 (9.4) 87.4 (13.4) 97.4 (14.3) 85.7 (19.9) 
Due to nontargeted UAPs, the models classified most images into COVID-19. Figure 1 
shows the confusion matrices for the COVID-Net models attacked using non-targeted 
UPAs with 𝑝 = ∞ . For the UAPs with 𝜁 = 1% , the COVIDNet-CXR Small model 
classified >70% of the normal and pneumonia test images into COVID-19. Moreover, the 
COVIDNet-CXR Large model classified approximately 90% of the normal and pneumonia 
images into COVID-19. For a higher 𝜁, this tendency was more significant. In particular, 
the COVIDNet-CXR Small and Large models judged almost all normal and pneumonia 
test images as COVID-19 cases when 𝜁 = 2%. Additionally, the tendency of adversarial 
images being classified into COVID-19 was observed when considering UAPs with 𝑝 =2 and the training image set. 
  
 
Figure 1. Confusion matrices for the COVID-Net models attacked using the 
nontargeted UPAs on the test images. 𝑝 = ∞ . Left and right panels represent the 
COVIDNet-CXR Small and COVIDNet-CXR Large models, respectively. The top and 
bottom panels indicate 𝜁 = 1% and 𝜁 = 2%, respectively. 
The nontargeted UAPs with 𝜁 = 1% and 𝜁 = 2% were almost imperceptible. Figure 2 
shows the nontargeted UPAs with 𝑝 = ∞  against the COVID-Net models and their 
adversarial images. The models classified the original X-ray images (left panels in Fig. 2) 
and correctly predicted their actual classes; however, they judged all adversarial images as 
COVID-19 cases due to the nontargeted UAPs. Similarly, the nontargeted UPAs with 𝑝 =2 were almost imperceptible. 
  
 
Figure 2. Nontargeted UAPs with 𝒑 = ∞ against the COVID-Net models and their 
adversarial images. UAPs (top panels) with 𝜁 = 1%  and 𝜁 = 2%  are shown. The 
models correctly classified the original images (left panels) into their actual labels. The 
predicted labels of all adversarial images are COVID-19. Note that the UAPs are 
emphatically displayed for clarity; in particular, each UAP is scaled by a maximum of 1 
and minimum of 0. 
3.3. Vulnerability to targeted universal adversarial perturbations 
Furthermore, we found that both COVIDNet-CXR Small model (Table 2) and COVIDNet-
CXR Large model (Table 3) were vulnerable to targeted UAPs. Subsequently, we 
considered the effect of the targeted attacks using UAPs to each class: normal, Pneumonia, 
and COVID-19. When 𝜁 = 1%, the targeted attack success rates, 𝑅-, for the test images 
were between approximately 60% and 85% and between approximately 55% and 95% for 
the COVIDNet-CXR Small and Large models, respectively. Conversely, 𝑅-  for the 
training images were between approximately 65% and 90% and between approximately 
55% and 90%. 𝑅- of the UAP with 𝑝 = 2 was generally higher than that of the UAP 
with 𝑝 = ∞, when the model and the other parameters were the same. Moreover, no 
remarkable difference in 𝑅- was observed between the target classes; however, 𝑅- of the 
targeted attacks to COVID-19 was relatively high in the COVIDNet-CXR Large model. 
  
Thus, a higher 𝜁 led to a higher 𝑅-. When 𝜁 = 2%, the 𝑅- values for both the training 
and test images were approximately 100%, regardless of the target classes. For the targeted 
attacks to normal and pneumonia, 𝑅-  of random UAPs for the test images were also 
relatively high; in particular, they were between approximately 35% and 45% and between 
approximately 30% and 45% for the COVIDNet-CXR Small model and COVIDNet-CXR 
Large model, respectively. 
Table 2. Targeted attack success rate 𝑹𝒔  (%) of targeted UAPs against the 
COVIDNet-CXR Small model to each target class. 𝑅- for training and test images are 
shown. The values in brackets are 𝑅- of random UAPs (random controls). 
𝒑 𝜻 Normal Pneumonia COVID-19 
Training Test Training Test Training Test 2 1% 88.1 (60.5) 78.4 (46.3) 76.7 (37.5) 71.4 (41.6) 68.1 (1.9) 74.0 (12.1) 
2% 99.4 (54.4) 97.8 (39.0) 99.4 (33.0) 98.7 (35.9) 100 (12.6) 99.1 (25.1) ∞	 1% 79.5 (60.7) 64.9 (45.9) 66.5 (37.5) 61.9 (41.6) 78.8 (1.8) 84.0 (12.6) 
2% 98.7 (56.3) 96.1 (39.4) 99.5 (34.1) 98.3 (37.7) 100 (9.5) 100 (22.9) 
Table 3. Targeted attack success rates 𝑹𝒔  (%) of targeted UAPs against the 
COVIDNet-CXR Large model to each target class. 𝑅- for training and test images are 
shown. The values in brackets are 𝑅- of random UAPs (random controls). 
𝒑 𝜻 Normal Pneumonia COVID-19 
Training Test Training Test Training Test 2 1% 85.2 (58.9) 71.4 (44.2) 72.6 (37.0) 66.2 (39.0) 92.4 (4.0) 95.2 (16.9) 
2% 99.2 (50.7) 98.3 (34.6) 99.5 (30.6) 98.7 (32.9) 100 (18.7) 100 (32.5) ∞	 1% 71.0 (59.2) 56.7 (44.2) 55.4 (37.0) 53.2 (40.3) 88.4 (3.7) 92.2 (15.6) 
2% 97.9 (52.7) 93.9 (35.9) 99.4 (32.3) 98.3 (33.8) 100 (14.9) 100 (30.3) 
It was difficult to classify the COVID-19 images into another targeted class (normal or 
pneumonia) when UAPs were relatively weak (i.e., 𝜁 = 1% ). Figure 3 shows the 
confusion matrices for the COVIDNet-CXR Small model attacked using targeted UPAs 
with 𝑝 = ∞. For both targeted attacks to normal and pneumonia, the model correctly 
predicted almost all COVID-19 images as COVID-19 cases, despite the targeted attacks. 
Conversely, approximately 50% of normal (pneumonia) images were classified into the 
targeted class pneumonia (normal). However, for a higher 𝜁 (i.e., 𝜁 = 2%), the targeted 
attacks of the COVID-19 images were successful; in particular, almost all COVID-19 
images were classified into the target class (normal or pneumonia) due to the UAP. The 
classification of the images into COVID-19 using targeted UAPs was easier than that into 
the other classes. Due to the UAP with 𝜁 = 1%, the model judged approximately 80% of 
normal and pneumonia images as COVID-19 cases, respectively. Similar tendencies were 
observed in the COVIDNet-CXR Large model, for targeted UPAs with 𝑝 = 2, and on the 
  
training image set. 
 
Figure 3. Confusion matrices for the COVIDNet-CXR Small model attacked with the 
targeted UPAs with 𝒑 = ∞  on the test images. The left, middle, and right panels 
represent the targeted classes: normal, pneumonia, and COVID-19, respectively. The top 
and bottom panels indicate 𝜁 = 1% and 𝜁 = 2%, respectively. 
The targeted UAPs were also almost imperceptible. Figure 2 shows the targeted UPAs with 	𝑝 = ∞  and 𝜁 = 2%  against the COVIDNet-CXR Small model and their adversarial 
images. The model classified the original images (left panels in Fig. 4) and correctly 
predicted their actual classes (source classes); however, it classified the adversarial images 
into each target class due to the targeted UAPs. The UAPs with 𝜁 = 1%  were also 
imperceptible. Additionally, the imperceptibility was confirmed in the UAPs with 𝑝 = 2 
and those against the COVIDNet-CXR Large model. 
  
 
Figure 4. Targeted UAPs (top panel) with 𝜻 = 𝟐%  and 𝒑 = ∞  against the 
COVIDNet-CXR Small model and their adversarial images. Note that the UAPs are 
emphatically displayed for clarity; in particular, each UAP is scaled by a maximum of 1 
and minimum of 0. 
3.4. Effect of adversarial retraining 
Adversarial retraining is often used to avoid adversarial attacks. We investigated the extent 
to which adversarial retraining increases the robustness of the COVIDNet-CXR Small 
model to nontargeted and targeted UAPs with 𝑝 = ∞. Adversarial retraining did not affect 
the test accuracy in both nontargeted and targeted cases; specifically, the accuracy on the 
(clean) test images remained constant at approximately 90% (Figs. 5A and 5B). 
For nontargeted attacks using UAPs with 𝜁 = 2%, 𝑅, for the test images declined with 
the iterations for adversarial retraining; in particular, it was 22.1% after five iterations (Fig. 
  
5A). The confusion matrix (Fig. 5C) for the fine-tuned model obtained after five iterations 
indicates that the normal and COVID-19 images were almost correctly classified despite 
the nontargeted UAPs, but 45% of the pneumonia images were still misclassified. 
For targeted attacks to COVID-19 using UAPs with 𝜁 = 1%, 𝑅-  for the test images 
decreased with the iterations for adversarial retraining (Fig. 5B); specifically, it was 16.5% 
after five iterations. The confusion matrix (Fig. 5D) for the fine-tuned model obtained after 
five iterations indicates that the normal and COVID-19 images were almost correctly 
classified despite the targeted UAPs, but 15% of the pneumonia images were still 
misclassified into COVID-19. 
 
Figure 5. Effect of adversarial retraining on the robustness to UAPs with 𝒑 = ∞ 
against the COVIDNet-CXR Small model. Scatter plots of (A) the fooling rate, 𝑅, (%), 
for nontargeted UAPs with 𝜁 = 2% versus the number, 𝑁0, of iterations for adversarial 
retraining and (B) the targeted attack success rate, 𝑅- (%), of targeted UAPs with 𝜁 =1% to COVID-19 versus 𝑁0. 𝑅, and 𝑅- are for the test images. The accuracies (%) on 
the set of clean test images are also shown. The confusion matrices for the fine-tuned 
models obtained after five iterations of adversarial retraining using the (C) nontargeted 
  
UAPs and (D) targeted UAPs. Note that these confusion matrices are for the fine-tuned 
models attacked using nontargeted and targeted UAPs, respectively.  
4. Discussion 
The COVID-Net models were vulnerable to small UAPs; moreover, they were slightly less 
robust to random UAPs. The results indicated that the DNN-based systems were easy to 
fool. Given that the vulnerability to UAPs is observed in various DNN architectures [23,24], 
they are expected to universally exist in DNN-based systems for detecting COVID-19 
cases.  
For nontargeted attacks, the COVID-Net models predicted most of the chest X-ray images 
as COVID-19 cases due the UAPs (Fig. 1), although the UAPs were almost imperceptible 
(Fig. 2). This result is consistent with the tendency that DNN models classify most inputs 
into a few specific classes due to nontargeted UAPs (i.e., existence of dominant labels in 
nontargeted attacks based on a UAP) [23]. moreover, this indicates that the models provide 
false positives in COVID-19 diagnosis, which may cause unwanted mental stress to 
patients and complicate the estimation of the number of COVID-19 cases. The dominant 
label of COVID-19, observed in this study, may be because the COVIDx dataset was 
imbalanced. The images in COVID-19 are dominantly fewer than those in normal and 
pneumonia. The algorithm considers maximizing the fooling rate; thus, a relatively large 
fooling rate is achieved when all inputs are classified into COVID-19 due to UAPs. In 
addition, the observed dominant label may be because the losses were computed by 
weighting to COVID-19 class. The decision for the COVID-19 class might be more 
susceptive to changes in pixel values than that for the other classes. 
The relatively easy targeted attacks to COVID-19 (Fig. 3) may be because COVID-19 was 
the dominant label. Moreover, the targeted attacks to normal and pneumonia were possible, 
despite almost imperceptible UAPs (Fig. 4). The results imply that a third party can control 
the DNN-based systems, which may lead to security concerns. The targeted attacks cause 
both false positives and negatives, and thus, can be used to adjust the number of COVID-
19 cases. Moreover, they may affect individual and social awareness of COVID-19 (e.g., 
voluntary restraint and social distancing). These may lead to problems in terms of public 
health (i.e., minimizing the spread of the pandemic) and economy. More generally, 
complex classifiers, including DNNs, are currently used for high-stake decision-making in 
healthcare; however, they can potentially cause catastrophic harm to society because they 
are often difficult to interpret [30]. 
A simple solution to avoid these problems is to make DNN-based systems closed-source 
and publicly unavailable; however, this conflicts with the purpose of accelerating the 
development of computer-based systems for detecting COVID-19 cases and COVID-19 
treatment. An alternative may be to consider black-box systems, such as closed application 
programming interfaces (APIs) and closed-source software in which only queries on inputs 
are allowed and outputs are accessible. Such closed APIs are better because they are at least 
publicly available. However, it is possible that the APIs are vulnerable to adversarial 
attacks. This is because UAPs have generalizability [23] (i.e., UAPs for a DNN can fool 
another DNN). That is, the adversarial attacks on black-box DNN-based systems may be 
possible using UAPs generated based on white-box DNNs. Moreover, several methods for 
  
adversarial attacks on black-box DNN-based systems, which estimate adversarial 
perturbations using only model outputs (e.g., confidence scores), have been proposed [31–
33]. 
Therefore, defense strategies against adversarial attacks should be considered. A simple 
defense strategy is to fine-tune DNN models using adversarial images [22,23,27]. In fact, 
we demonstrated that iterative fine-tuning of a DNN model using UAPs improved the 
robustness of the DNN model to nontargeted and targeted UAPs (Fig. 5). However, the 
iterative fine-tuning method required high computational costs; moreover, it did not 
perfectly avoid vulnerability to UAPs. In addition, several methods breaching defenses 
using adversarial retraining have already been proposed [27]. Alternatively, dimensionality 
reduction (e.g., principle component analysis), distributional detection (e.g., maximum 
mean discrepancy), and normalization detection (e.g., dropout randomization) may be 
useful for adversarial defenses; however, adversarial examples are not easily detected using 
these approaches [27]. Defending against adversarial attacks is a cat-and-mouse game [26]; 
thus, it may be difficult to completely avoid security concerns caused by adversarial attacks. 
However, the development of methods for defending against adversarial attacks has been 
advanced. For example, detecting adversarial attack-based robustness to random noise [34], 
use of a discontinuous activation function that purposely invalidates the DNN’s gradient at 
densely distributed input data points [35], and DNNs for purifying adversarial examples 
[36] may help reduce the concerns. 
In conclusion, we demonstrated the vulnerability of DNNs for detecting COVID-19 cases 
to nontargeted and targeted attacks based on UAPs. Our findings emphasize that careful 
consideration is required in developing DNN-based systems for detecting COVID-19 cases 
and their practical applications.  
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